2013/01 | LEM Working Paper Series | |
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A Simple Model of Conflict |
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Sebastian Ille |
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Keywords | ||
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Social Conflict, Social Change, Evolutionary Game, Stability of Equilibria
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JEL Classifications | ||
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C62,C73,D72,D74
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Abstract | ||
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This paper develops a simple dynamic, non-symmetric game between two
player populations that can be generalised to a large variety of
conflicts. One population attempts to re-write a current (social)
contract in its favour, whereas the other prefers to maintain the
status quo. In the model’s initial set up, the free-rider problem
obstructs the occurrence of a conflict, leading to a low probability
of a successful turn-over. The normative and conventional framework,
in which players interact, plays however a vital role in the evolution
of conflicts. By relating the individual pay-off perceptions for each
strategy to the type and frequency of norm violations, the free-rider
effect can be considerably weakened, thus enabling the model to
predict the existence of two stable equilibria; one with a high rate
of conflict, and another in which no conflict arises. This second
equilibrium is caused by a triggering event. The model provides an
explanation of how and why these events may occur and under which
conditions they can be observed more frequently. In addition, it is
also shown which factors influence the equilibria’s basin of
attraction, i.e. the likelihood of a transition and hence the
probability of a conflict.
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