


On the informational efficiency of markets

Giulio Bottazzi Pietro Dindo


LEM, Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa

Toward an alternative macroeconomic analysis of microfoundations,
finance-real economy dynamics and crisis
Budapest, 6-8 September 2010


Asset market and feedbacks




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The message

As soon as (current, expected or realized) prices enter in the investment decisions of agents, the market can display multiple and stable long-run equilibria or persistent oscillatory dynamics.


These long-run equilibria lead to informational inefficiency.

We proved these proposition true in a GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL even without frictions, adjustment/information costs or informational asymmetries.


- Two states of the world, $s = 1, 2$, which occur with probability π and $1 - \pi$ in a Bernoulli process.
- Two (short-lived) Arrow securities, $k = 1, 2$ in unit supply. Security k pays 1 if state of the world k is realized, 0 otherwise.
- Two agents, $i = 1, 2$, with wealth $w_{i,t}$. Let $\alpha_{i,t}$ be the fraction of wealth that agent i invests in security 1 at time t . $1 - \alpha_{i,t}$ is invested in security 2. No consumption WLOG.

Walrasian price-fixing of asset 1 at time t (dropping time index)

$$1 = \frac{\alpha_1}{p_1} w_1 + \frac{\alpha_2}{p_1} w_2$$



$$p_1 = \alpha_1 \phi_1 + \alpha_2 (1 - \phi_1) \quad \text{with} \quad \phi_i = w_i / (w_1 + w_2).$$




Suppose α s are constant, where does the market converge? E s are the only fixed points.

Consider the relative entropy of investment strategy w.r.t. the true probability measure

$$I_i(\alpha_i) = \pi \log \frac{\pi}{\alpha_i} + (1 - \pi) \log \frac{1 - \pi}{1 - \alpha_i} .$$

$I_i \geq 0$ represents information **loss**: the lower, the greater the agreement of the strategy with the true process.



I_i it represents a sort of distance from the “probability” line in the EMC plot.







The only stable equilibrium is the one in which the **best informed** agent survives (S_1).



α s can contain price dependence because:


- In the example above, prices reflect best information. Why not use them?
- Prices is what we know in real markets (unobservable or not-stationary “fundamental” process)
- Preferences can be different from log-utility.











$$U = \{ \gamma \sum_S \pi(s) u(c_1(s)) + \gamma^2 \sum_S \pi(s) u(c_2(s)) + \dots \}, u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma}$$

$$\text{Max } U \text{ given budget implies } \alpha_k = \left(\frac{\gamma \pi(k)}{p_k} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} p_k$$

- Behavioral Finance (a survey is Barberis and Thaler, 2003)
 - Pros Ecology of strategies behaviorally grounded
 - Cons No wealth-driven strategy selection
 - Focus Market biases
- HAM Finance (a survey is Hommes, 2006)
 - Pros Focus on price feedbacks
 - Cons No wealth-driven strategy selection (mostly CARA), deterministic
 - Focus Stylized facts
- Evolutionary Finance (Kelly, 1956; Blume and Easley, 1992; a survey is Evstigneev, Hens, and Schenk-Hoppe, 2009)
 - Pros Multi-asset stochastic general equilibrium framework
 - Cons Absence of price feedbacks (no endogenous investment rules)
 - Focus Market selection

⇒ Our approach: evolutionary finance with endogenous (price dependent) investment rules.

http://www.lem.sssup.it/paper_seminars/budapest/bottazzi.pdf

Paper at the conference site.



Journal of Evolutionary Economic special issue “Evolution and market behavior in economics and finance”, Bottazzi and Dindo (eds.) forthcoming