The North-South divide: sources of divergence, policies for convergence

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The North-South divide: sources of divergence, policies for convergence*

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Abstract

Building upon the labour-augmented K+S modelling framework (Dosi et al., 2010, 2017, 2020), we address the analysis of the North-South divide by means of an agent-based model (ABM) endogenously reproducing divergence between two artificial macro-regions characterized by identical initial conditions in terms of productive and innovation structures, but different labour market organizations. Given the ex-ante initial conditions, we identify the role played by different functioning of the labour markets on the possible divergence across the two regions. We do find that divergences in labour market reverberate into asymmetric productive performance due to negative reinforcing feedback loop dynamics. We then confront alternative policy schemes by showing that investment policies directed at increasing machine renewal and higher substitutionary investment are the most effective in fostering the convergence process.

JEL classification: C63, J3 , E24, O1

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1 Introduction

The Italian North-South gap has been a long-lasting phenomenon since country unification, temporarily reduced in the two decades after WWII, the so called Italian ‘economic miracle’, and then resurfaced again (Papagni et al., 2021). More recently, the sovereign debt and the pandemic crises have fuelled territorial divides while the gap in the productive structure is crystallising, with the Northern regions responsible for the majority of the production and with rising geographical inequalities. Although being a textbook case, the Italian economy is not the only one characterised by territorial divides: it is the case of the inner versus coastal areas in the US or China, the South versus the North in Great Britain, and historically the West and the East Germany, just to mention a few cases among developed and emerging economies. As such, the analysis of territorial divergences is per se a relevant object of investigation.

With reference to the Italian North-South gap, so far, the literature has mostly focused on sources of divergence deriving from asymmetries in productive performance - e.g. per capita GDP - and their negative impact on inequality and regional disparities among Northern and Southern areas (Viesti et al., 2011; Daniele and Malanima, 2014; Felice, 2019). In addition, territorial divides have been usually studied from an empirical standpoint, and mostly through historical lenses. In this paper we take an alternative route by drawing on the complexity approach and agent-based models. We focus on a particular source of divergence, that is the different regulation/deregulation of the labour market acting as the first order channel fuelling into, in turns, the productive performance. On the empirical ground, corroborating our modelling choices, although transformations in labour market institutions pertain to the entire Italian economy, concentration of temporary and part-time contracts, reduction in working hours and wage stagnation have been more pronounced in the Southern Italian regions (Cetrulo et al., 2021).

Building upon the labour-augmented Keynes + Schumpeter (K+S) modelling framework (Dosi et al., 2010, 2017, 2020), we address the analysis of the North-South divide by means of an agent-based model (ABM) endogenously reproducing the divergence between two artificial macro-regions characterized by identical initial conditions in terms of productive and innovation structures, but different labour market organizations. The labour market setting of the two regions entails that more stable industrial relations, employment stability and opportunity of wage growth characterise the North, while a weaker, more informal and more volatile labour market characterises the South. Given the ex-ante initial conditions of the two macro-regions, we identify the role played by different functioning of the labour markets on the divergence outcome. We do find that divergences in labour market reverberate into asymmetric productive performance due to negative reinforcing feedback loop dynamics.

After studying the extent to which such divergences might be accounted by propagation effects from the labour market to the productive structure, we compare alternative policy experiments implemented in the South region in order to detect possible patterns of convergence. Such policies include: an investment policy intended to foster higher scrapping of machines, a learning policy directed to increase workers on-the-job skills, a wage policy increasing the indexation of firm-level wage growth to firm-level productivity growth.

According to our results, the investment policy is the most effective strategy to foster convergence, while at the opposite end higher firm-level indexation of wage adjust-
ments to idiosyncratic productivity growth, i.e. decentralised wage indexation, do not foster convergence at all. Finally, higher worker learning regimes operate as a selecting device cleansing the market from low-productive firms, by increasing their exit rate. This is confirmed by the results of the productivity decomposition exercise we perform in order to account for the overall, within, between, entry and exit components of productivity growth. The policy exercise highlights the relevance of improving the productivity of capital equipment, and therefore the relevance of investment plans that require to be undertaken in order to increase the overall performance dynamics of Southern areas.

The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses sources of divergence among regions/countries characterised by different development patterns and potential policy strategies to circumvent such divergence. In Section 3 we present our agent-based model. Section 4 shows the diverging structure of our two-region set-up. Finally, in Section 5 we present the results of alternative convergence policies at the macro level; we then decompose the labour productivity growth into within, between, entry, exit, and cross effects to detect which component is more relevant in affecting the overall productivity dynamics. Section 6 concludes the paper.

2 North-South divides

The Section provides a brief literature overview on the possible sources of divergence among countries or regions (Subsection 2.1), and the existing policy strategies for the convergence among areas characterized by different development patterns (Subsection 2.2). Moreover, as we investigate this topic by means of a computational Agent-Based Model (ABM), in Subsection 2.3 we also briefly review the recent contributions proposing multi-region or multi-country set-ups of ABMs.

2.1 Sources of divergence

The study of divergences across countries and regions is at the core of economic development theories, looking at the heterogeneous macroeconomic and sectoral outcomes determined by the industrialization process (Kuznets, 1955), and their consequences on income distribution, usually characterized by the so called ‘inverted U-shape’ Kuznets curve (Williamson, 1965). However, persistent divergences and regional divides may follow even after the convergence is reached, therefore presenting an S-shaped rather than an inverted U-shaped pattern (see, among others, Amos Jr, 1988 and Daniele and Malanima, 2014).

Alternative theoretical perspectives have addressed the problem of regional/country divergence: the structuralist approach to North-South gaps analysing asymmetric productive composition, patterns of technological learning and specialisation between advanced and developing economies (Cimoli, 1988; Cimoli and Dosi, 1995; Dosi et al., 2009; Cimoli and Porcile, 2014; Dosi et al., 2021); the ‘core-periphery’ approach to study asymmetries among member states within the European Monetary Union (EMU) (Storm and Naastepad, 2015; Landesmann et al., 2015; Celi et al., 2019) and more in general uneven development along international value chains (Pavlínek, 2018) drawing from the dependency theory (Prebisch, 1950); the socio-economic divide among regions of (relatively) recently unified countries, such as Italy (Daniele and Malanima, 2011) or Germany (Blum, 2013; Boltho et al., 2018; Blum, 2019).
The Italian case-study is indeed particularly relevant for the analysis of North-South gaps due to both the weaker economic performance when compared to other European countries from a core-periphery perspective, and the persistence of divergence between North-Centre and Southern areas within the country (Svimez, 2019, 2020), after the relative convergence experienced between the ’50 and the ’70 (Daniele and Malanima, 2011; Viesti et al., 2011). Since the national unification (1861), the Italian productive fabric has been characterized by strong heterogeneities due to different degrees and paces of industrialization between North/Centre areas and the South (the so-called ‘Mezzogiorno’). A crucial role has been also played by the structural change process, with three different phases of modern growth and development identified by economic historians, namely the first phase - from 1861 to the post-World War II - characterized by the intensive sectoral shift from agriculture to manufacturing in the Northern regions - especially in the North-West (the so called “Industrial triangle” covering Milan - Turin - Genoa) - and the slower or inadequate industrialization of the South (Federico and Toniolo, 1991; Fenoaltea, 2005); the second phase of industrialization from developed to developing areas, i.e. from North/Centre to the South, recording an exceptional period of convergence (Paci and Pigliaru, 1997), i.e. the so-called Italian ‘economic miracle’(’50-’70); the third phase of progressive sectoral shift from manufacturing to service sectors (the so-called ‘tertiarization’) on the top of heterogeneously developed productive structures, with the concentration of more productive services in the North and widening and amplifying the persistent North-South gap (Capasso et al., 2008; Daniele and Malanima, 2011).

The deep roots of such divide indeed trace back to the post-unification period but reverberate until recent economic downturns. The severity of the intertwined crises experienced by the Italian economy during the last decades (Felice et al., 2019) - i.e. the productivity slowdown, the fiscal crisis, the Great Recession, and last the pandemic-induced crisis - have been strengthened by the institutional set-up, the weak investment in research and innovation, the lack of strategic planning and the abandonment of any industrial policy or policy of industrial upgrading (Felice et al., 2019; Dosi et al., 2020, 2021).

So far, the literature has mainly focused on the divergences in productive performance, e.g. per capita GDP, and their negative impact on inequality and regional disparities among Northern and Southern areas (Viesti et al., 2011; Daniele and Malanima, 2014). However, a less investigated channel of divergence is the one going in the opposite direction, that is from asymmetries in the labour market and inequality towards asymmetries in productive performance. On this ground, Svimez (2019) discusses how the increasing trend of socio-economic inequalities, together with the relatively higher poverty risk and the weaker general working conditions have marked the Southern regions during the last twenty years. Indeed, these areas recorded a higher share of working poors over the total workforce (26.6%) and a higher and increasing school dropout rate (18.8%) as compared to the Center and the North (11.7%). In addition, gender asymmetries are by far stronger and deeper. Cetrulo et al. (2021) highlight how the divergence in the Italian labour market across geographical areas is indeed a stylized fact characterising the last thirty-five years. Notably, the year in which the first flexibilization reform (Legge Treu) has been introduced represents a turning point for the territorial divergence. This occurs as a result of the progressive use of temporary and part-time contracts in the Southern regions, reducing the labour activity and the overall individual working time, and therefore the weekly wage. In addition, the job shares, intended as capacity to create new job de-
mands, remained roughly stable across macro-geographical areas, with the exception of the North-West recording a slight decline, but with the overall fraction in Southern regions almost constant over the entire time period.

The recent socio-economic crisis due to the pandemic diffusion of Covid-19 has further revealed the relevance of the North-South divergences in terms of the capacity of absorbing the shock. Pre-existing divides such as income and wealth distribution, gender disparities, living conditions, and sectoral heterogeneities have been amplifying the pandemic shock as acknowledged by Svimez (2020), devoting special attention to labour market outcomes. The report highlights how the consequences of the pandemic on employment, income vulnerability, and unemployment risk have been harsher for the Southern regions, migrant and temporary workers, with a decrease of households disposable income of 9.9%.

2.2 Policies for convergence

Given the existence of divergences across areas, regions, countries, which policies can foster economic convergence? We identify at least two different theoretical approaches to catching-up and convergence processes, and thus two categories for the related policies.

On the one hand, market-based policies such as foreign direct investments (FDI) and off-shoring of production processes from developed to developing countries aimed at increasing the production capacity of receiving countries (Dutt, 1997, 1998); flexibilization and liberalization of factors of production in developing areas, particularly labour, aimed at favouring their mobility (Faini, 1996; Clemens, 2009, 2010), or alternatively but on the same theoretical ground decentralized wage regimes allowing for flexible firm-level (or maximum sectoral-level) wage bargaining and wage-productivity indexation (Dustmann et al., 2014). On these lines, Boeri et al. (2021) recently advance a revival of flexible wage systems allowing for local bargaining as a policy tool capable to address the higher non-employment and productivity nexus, intended as the nexus between low productive provinces and low labour absorption, recorded in Italy when compared to Germany. In particular, they ascribe the lower employment rates and productivity performance of Southern regions to the constraint to wage lowering faced by firms operating in those areas, constraint due to the Italian nationwide wage bargaining system. Thus, by comparing West-East Germany and North-South Italy wage and productivity differentials, according to their results the latter would benefit from a German-type flexible local bargaining. Focused on market-based functioning, this kind of policies is often rooted on the idea that catching-up is an automatic process driven by market adjustments and cost-reduction strategies aimed at enhancing the production performance of less developed regions or countries (Dosi et al., 1994; Cimoli and Dosi, 1995).

Alternatively to market-based policies and rooted on the evolutionary theory of economic development, institutional-based strategies propose a set of complementary policy tools, namely, innovation-oriented policies aimed at creating or improving National (NIS) and Sectoral Innovation Systems (SIS) (Lundvall, 1992; Freeman, 2002) more broadly defined; medium and long-run direct and targeted industrial policies nurturing the development of production capabilities, risky investments in innovative projects, disruptive and imitative innovative behaviours in firms located in upstream sectors of the production ladder, and physical capital investments in downstream sectors, skills upgrading and
training programs (Dosi et al., 2009); public subsidies and specific investment programs oriented towards the convergence of falling behind regions.

Back to the Italian case, specific investment programs and public subsidies have been at the core of convergence policy strategies implemented in Italy since the fifties. On this ground, the combination of the ‘agrarian reform’ and the institution of the Southern Development Fund (i.e. the so-called ‘Cassa del Mezzogiorno’) in 1950, have crucially driven the process of socio-economic convergence between Southern and Northern regions during the ‘Italian boom’ (Daniele and Malanima, 2011). In particular, between the fifties and the seventies, specific public investment programs in capital-intensive sectors (such as chemistry or iron and steel industry) together with the increasing capital accumulation process contributed to enrich the production capacity of the South by also bolstering the industrialization process (Clark, 2014). Nevertheless, the prevalence of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) operating in specific industrial districts undermined the industrial development of the Mezzogiorno by leading to ‘soft’ or incomplete industrialization of Southern regions - the so called cathedrals in the desert - unable to promote genuine convergence processes. At the end of the seventies the country was divided into ‘three Italies’, the industrialized North - especially the North-West -, few industrial districts in the South, and the rest of the Mezzogiorno (Bagnasco, 1977). Since the mid-1970s, the combination of negative external shocks (i.e. the ‘stagflation’), the progressive structural change from manufacturing to service sectors, and the turn in the national politics - cutting public investments for the South development from 13% to 8% of Italian GDP during the seventies (Daniele and Malanima, 2011) -, turned the convergence process into an halt, paving the way for the persistent North-South divergences faced until the Great Recession (2007-08) (Lagravinese, 2015) and the current global pandemic crisis (Svimez, 2019, 2020; Dosi et al., 2020).

In the aftermath of the pandemic-induced crisis, public investments meant to cure territorial divergences are part of the national framework of the Italian ‘Recovery and Resilience Plan’ (‘Piano Nazionale di Ripresa e Resilienza’, PNRR), the national program for the implementation of the Next Generation EU recovery plan. On this ground, 40% of the entire budget (82.4 billion euros) should be devoted to specific investments for the economic development of the South, the sick of Italy. Indeed, sources of divergence and policies of convergence of the North-South gap represent a crucial element to undertake sustainable and virtuous development trajectories in the next future.

2.3 The Agent-Based approach to regional divides: a brief overview

The complexity approach to economics has contributed to the analysis of patterns of divergence across regions and economic areas. To this scope, multi-country versions of agent-based models have been implemented to analyse different dimensions affecting the divergence patterns among countries, such as international trade, monetary union integration, or differential growth and development trajectories.

On this ground, building on the large-scale ABM Eurace@Unibi (Deissenberg et al., 2017), Dawid et al. (2018) propose a multi-country model reproducing the European economy, wherein they investigate the effects of fiscal transfers within the European Monetary Union (EMU), by highlighting how they may revert the persistent divergence between core and periphery countries.

On similar lines, building on the Agent Based-Stock Flow Consistent (AB-SFC) macroe-
conomic model presented in Caiani et al. (2016), Caiani et al. (2018, 2019) analyse the effects of, respectively, different fiscal or wage regimes within the EMU, by implementing a multi-country model that simulates an artificial monetary union.

Moreover, Dosi et al. (2019) following both the Keynes + Schumpeter (K+S) evolutionary tradition (Dosi et al., 2010) and the Kaldorian research line, recently propose a multi-country model aimed at reproducing the international divergence across different countries, looking at the effects of the interplay between firms’ evolutionary innovation process, industrial dynamics, macroeconomic growth and productivity patterns upon different development trajectories.

3 The model

3.1 General description

We now start presenting the agent-based model able to account for the North-South divide. We compare the dynamics of two different artificial macro-regions characterized by the same initial conditions but different labour market structures, turning into different informality levels and degree of security of employment relationship. Such different organization of the labour markets turns into divergences of efficiency variables such as productivity, innovation and investment rates distinctly characterizing the two regions.

The model is built upon the Keynes + Schumpeter ABM, characterized by two dynamically coupled domains, that is an endogenous growth process driven by innovations and their adoption and diffusion, i.e. the Schumpeterian engine, and an aggregate demand process driven by firms’ investment and workers’ consumption, i.e. the Keynesian engine.

Figure 1 describes the bare-bones structure of the model. It builds upon Dosi et al. (2017, 2018a), that is the labour-augmented version of the basic K+S artificial economy (Dosi et al., 2010), a general disequilibrium, stock-and-flow consistent, agent-based model, populated by heterogeneous workers/consumers, capital-good firms, consumption-good firms, and banks, with a central bank and a government.\(^1\) Agents’ behaviour follows bounded-rational rules. We model two distinct labour markets in terms of differentiated mechanisms of job hiring and firing, search process, and wage setting to characterize the two regions.\(^2\)

The model highlights the importance of increasing knowledge in the growth of productivity by distinguishing firms that produce capital-goods and those producing consumption goods. Capital good firms invest in R&D and produce heterogeneous goods/services/knowledge rising, in turns, consumption-good firms’ productivity. This is the locus of endogenous innovation, characterized by imperfect information and Schumpeterian competition driven by technological change. Given the increased proportion of investment in software and in information, communication, and technology equipment, we interpret the functioning of this sector as extending beyond traditional producers of machine tools/equipment so to include those developing new software and information, technology, and communication goods and services.

\(^1\)Subscript \(t\) stands for (discrete) time \(t = 1, 2, ..., T\). Agent-specific variables are denoted by subscript \(\ell\), in case of workers, \(i\), for capital-good firms, \(j\), for consumption-good firms, and \(k\), for banks.

\(^2\)The code and a user-friendly interface are freely accessible at https://github.com/SantAnnaKS/LSD.
Since creating knowledge crucially depends on human activity, we let labour being the only production factor within the capital-good sector. This type of firms report both the price and productivity of their machines and services to current customers together with a subset of potential new ones, and invest a share of past revenues in R&D, in order to improve their products. They also set selling prices with a fixed mark-up over labour costs. As in a typical model run within capital-good firms workers represent less than 10% of the employed labour force, we focus our attention on labour patterns within the consumption-good sector.

Figure 1: The model overall structure.

Consumption-good firms combine capital vintages acquired from capital-good firms with labour input in order to produce a single and quality-differentiated good for consumers, under constant returns to scale. The desired production is driven by adaptive demand expectations. Given certain accumulated inventories, if the current capital stock does not allow firms to produce the desired output, they can order new machines to expand their production capacity, by funding the new order via retained past profits or, up to a certain limit, via bank loans. Then, they replace old machines according to a payback-period rule. In particular, firms choose the capital-good supplier depending on the price and productivity of the machines. As new machines embed state-of-the-art technologies, the productivity of consumption-good firms increases over time. Furthermore, consumption-good firms also set their selling prices with a variable mark-up over labour production costs in order to balance profit margins and market shares, by raising (lowering) mark-ups and prices when market shares expand (decline). Due to imperfect information their consumers switch gradually to the most competitive producer so that market shares evolve according to a replicator dynamics as more competitive firms expand, while less competitive firms shrink or close down.

The entry-exit process of firms is endogenous in both sectors. Firms exit when market
shares get close to zero or go bankrupt when net assets turn negative. On the contrary, firms enter the market through a stochastic process depending on both the number of incumbents and financial conditions. Entry is easier when the sectoral liquidity-to-debt ratio is high. Banks take deposits and provide interest-paying loans to finance firms’ production and investment plans, and they allocate credit to firms seeking credit according to a loan-to-value ratio rule. The credit supply is elastic.

The labour market is modelled as a decentralized search-and-hire process between workers and firms. Workers search for jobs from a random subset of employers. The unemployed workers also submit job applications to firms. A certain share of employed workers apply for better positions. Larger firms have a proportionally higher probability of receiving job applications, which are organized in firm-specific application queues. Capital-good firms hire workers according to their demands, whereas consumption-good firms hire workers depending on adaptive demand expectations; while for the sake of simplicity, banks, central bank and government employ no workers. The aggregate supply of labour is fixed and available to be hired in any period.

The labour market is also characterized by imperfect highly localized information. Firms observe workers’ skills and wage requests on their own queues, while workers are aware only of the offered wage from firms where they applied for a job. Firms decide whether to hire, fire or keep the current labour force. Each hiring firm makes a unique wage offer to job applicants, depending on the economy-wide productivity in the case of the north region and on the received applications in the south region. Workers select the best wage offer from firms to which they submitted the applications, with employed workers quitting the current job in presence of a better offer.

We treat one round of interactions between workers and firms per period. The overall labour demand depends on the aggregate demand of the economy, which allows for the possibility that labour market does not clear even if firing or hiring transaction costs are not considered. Firms may fail to fill all the open positions, and workers may not find a job even in presence of still unfilled positions. Systematic discrepancies between vacancies and involuntary unemployed workers are likely to be the rule rather than the exception in the aggregate model dynamics.

Workers spend their income to acquire consumption goods. If consumers’ supply for goods falls short of demand, the demand excess is saved in commercial banks for future consumption. Moreover, the central bank sets the reserves from banks and bails out the failing ones. On the other hand, government taxes firms and banks’ profits, pays unemployment benefits, sets a minimum wage, absorbs profits and losses from the central bank and keeps a non-explosive public debt trajectory in the long run.

The following subsections present the main model equations governing core economic processes driving the divergence between our artificial regions, that is innovation, investment and production process as well as labour demand, the hiring process, workers’ skill accumulation and wages indexation rules.

**Technical change**

The technology of capital-good firms is defined as \((A_i^\tau, B_i^\tau)\). \(A_i^\tau\) is the labour productivity of the machine-tool manufactured by firm \(i\) for the consumption-good sector, while \(B_i^\tau\)
is the labour productivity to produce the machine. Superscript $\tau$ denotes the technology vintage being produced/used. Given the monetary average wage $w_{i,t}$ paid by firm $i$, its unit cost of production is:

$$c_{i,t} = \frac{w_{i,t}}{B_{i,\tau}}. \quad (1)$$

Under a fixed mark-up $\mu_1 \in \mathbb{R}_+$ pricing rule, price $p_{i,t}$ of firm $i$ is defined as:

$$p_{i,t} = (1 + \mu_1)c_{i,t}. \quad (2)$$

Firms in the capital-good industry adaptively strive to increase market shares and profits by improving technology via innovation and imitation. Firms invest in R&D a fraction $\nu \in [0, 1]$ of their past sales $S_{i,t-1}$:

$$RD_{i,t} = \nu S_{i,t-1}. \quad (3)$$

R&D activity is performed by workers devoted to this activity, whose demand is:

$$L_{R&D}^{i,t} = \frac{RD_{i,t}}{w_{i,t}}. \quad (4)$$

Firms split their R&D workers $L_{R&D}^{i,t}$ between innovation ($IN_{i,t}$) and imitation ($IM_{i,t}$) activities according to the parameter $\xi \in [0, 1]$:

$$IN_{i,t} = \xi L_{R&D}^{i,t}, \quad (5)$$

$$IM_{i,t} = (1 - \xi) L_{R&D}^{i,t}. \quad (6)$$

Innovation is a two-step process. The first determines whether a firm obtains or not access to an innovation – irrespectively of whether it will ultimately be a success or a failure – through a draw from a Bernoulli distribution with mean:

$$\theta_{in}^{i,t} = 1 - e^{-\zeta_1 IN_{i,t}}, \quad (7)$$

with parameter $\zeta_1 \in [0, 1]$. If a firm innovates, it may draw a new machine-embodying technology ($A_{in}^{i,t}, B_{in}^{i,t}$) according to:

$$A_{in}^{i,t} = A_{i,t}(1 + x_{A_{in}}^{i,t}), \quad (8)$$

$$B_{in}^{i,t} = B_{i,t}(1 + x_{B_{in}}^{i,t}), \quad (9)$$

where $x_{A_{in}}^{i,t}$ and $x_{B_{in}}^{i,t}$ are two independent draws from a Beta $(\alpha_1, \beta_1)$ distribution, $(\alpha_1, \beta_1) \in \mathbb{R}_+^2$ over the fixed support $[\underline{x_1}, \bar{x_1}] \subset \mathbb{R}$.

Imitation also follows a two-step procedure. The access to imitation comes from sampling a Bernoulli with mean:

$$\theta_{im}^{i,t} = 1 - e^{-\zeta_2 IM_{i,t}}, \quad (10)$$

being parameter $\zeta_2 \in [0, 1]$. Firms accessing the second stage may copy technology ($A_{im}^{i,t}, B_{im}^{i,t}$) from a close competitor and select the machine to produce using the rule:

$$\min[p_{h_{i,t}} + b e_{A_{h_{i,t}}}^{h}], \quad h = \tau, in, im, \quad (11)$$

where $b \in \mathbb{R}_+$ is a payback parameter.
Expansionary and substitutionary investments

Firms in consumption-good sector do not conduct R&D, instead they access new technologies incorporating new machines to their existing capital stock $\Xi_{j,t}$. Firms invest according to expected demand $D_{j,t}$, computed by an adaptive rule:

$$D_{j,t}^c = g(D_{j,t-1}, D_{j,t-2}, D_{j,t-h}), \quad 0 < h < t,$$

where $D_{j,t-h}$ is the actual demand faced by firm $j$ at time $t - h$. $h \in \mathbb{N}$ is a parameter and $g : \mathbb{R}^h \to \mathbb{R}_+$ is the expectation function, usually an unweighted moving average over 4 periods. The corresponding desired level of production $Q_{j,t}^d$, considering the actual inventories $N_{j,t}$ from previous period, is:

$$Q_{j,t}^d = (1 + \iota)D_{j,t}^c - N_{j,t-1}, \quad (13)$$

being $N_{j,t}^d = \iota D_{j,t}^c$ the desired inventories and $\iota \in \mathbb{R}_+$ a parameter.

If the desired capital stock $K_{j,t}^d$ – computed as a linear function of the desired level of production $Q_{j,t}^d$ – is higher than the current $K_{j,t}$, firms invest $EI_{j,t}^d$ to expand capacity:

$$EI_{j,t}^d = K_{j,t}^d - K_{j,t-1} - 1,$$  \hspace{1cm} (14)

Replacement investment $SI_{j,t}^d$, to substitute a set $RS_{j,t}$ of existing machines by more productive ones, is decided according to a fixed payback period $b \in \mathbb{R}_+$. Machines $A_{i}^t \in \Xi_{j,t}$ are evaluated by the ratio between the price of new machines and the corresponding cost savings:

$$RS_{j,t} = \left\{ A_{i}^t \in \Xi_{j,t} : \frac{p_{i,t}^*}{c_{j,t}^* - c_{j,t}^*} \leq b \right\}, \quad (15)$$

where $p_{i,t}^*$ and $c_{j,t}^*$ are the price and unit cost of production upon the selected new machine.

The firm effective productivity $A_{j,t}$ results from both machine (notional) productivity $A_{i}^t$ and worker skills $s_{\ell,t}$, as described later, and is computed as:

$$A_{j,t} = \frac{1}{L_{j,t-1}} \sum_{\ell \in \{L_{j,t-1}\}} A_{\ell,t}, \quad (16)$$

where, $L_{j,t}$ is the set of workers at firm $j$, $\{L_{j,t}\}$, the size of this set, and $A_{\ell,t}$ worker $\ell$ productivity.

**Skills dynamics**

The skill level $s_{\ell,t} \in \mathbb{R}_+$ of worker $\ell$ evolves in time $t$ as a multiplicative process:

$$s_{\ell,t} = \begin{cases} 
(1 + \tau_T)s_{\ell,t-1} & \text{if employed in } t - 1 \\
\frac{1}{1 + \tau_U}s_{\ell,t-1} & \text{if unemployed in } t - 1,
\end{cases} \quad (17)$$

where $(\tau_T, \tau_U) \in \mathbb{R}_+^2$ are parameters governing the learning rate while the worker is employed or unemployed, respectively. When hired, worker acquires the minimum skill level present in the firm, if above her present level. Worker has a fixed working life, retires after a number of periods $T_{r}$, and is replaced by a new one with skills equal to the minimum among employed workers.
Worker ℓ current skills \( s_{\ell,t} \) define her individual (potential) productivity:

\[
A_{\ell,t} = \frac{s_{\ell,t}}{\bar{s}_t} A^*_t,
\]

being \( \bar{s}_t \) the average overall skill level and \( A^*_t \) the standard notional productivity of the specific machinery vintage the worker operates.

The adopted definition of skills implies that the latter are firm-specific rather than individual-specific and accumulate with job tenure. Therefore, whenever workers quit and are hired by a new firm, a new process of firm-level skill acquisition starts. The acquired minimum skill level in the entry period represents an economy-wide minimum floor.

### Labour search-and-match and wage determination

Labour demand in the consumption-good sector \( L^d_{j,t} \) is determined by desired production \( Q^d_{j,t} \) and the average productivity of current capital stock \( A_{j,t} \):

\[
L^d_{j,t} = \frac{Q^d_{j,t}}{A_{j,t}}.
\]

In the capital-good sector, instead, \( L^d_{i,t} \) considers orders \( Q_{i,t} \) and labour productivity \( B_{i,t} \).

In what follows, only the behaviour of the consumption-good firms (subscript \( j \)) is shown but capital-good sector operates under the same rules, except it follows the wage offers from top-paying firms in the consumption-good sector.

Firms decide whether to hire (or fire) workers according to the expected production \( Q^d_{j,t} \). If it is increasing, \( \Delta L^d_{j,t} \) new workers are (tentatively) hired in addition to the existing number \( L_{j,t-1} \). Each firm (expectedly) gets a fraction of the number of applicant workers \( L_{a,t} \) in its candidates queue \( \{\ell^s_{j,t}\} \), proportional to firm market share \( f_{j,t} \):

\[
E(L^s_{j,t}) = (\omega(1 - U_{t-1}) + \omega_u U_{t-1}) L^S f_{j,t-1},
\]

where \( L^S \) is the (fixed) total labour supply, \( U_t \) is the unemployment rate and \( \omega, \omega_u \in \mathbb{R}_+ \) are parameters defining the number of applications each job seeker sends if employed or unemployed, respectively. Considering the set of workers in \( \{\ell^s_{j,t}\} \), each firm selects the subset of desired workers \( \{\ell^d_{j,t}\} \) to make a job (wage) offer:

\[
\{\ell^d_{j,t}\} = \{\ell_{j,t} \in \{\ell^s_{j,t}\} : w_{r,\ell,t} \leq w_{o,j,t}\},
\]

Firms target workers that would accept the wage offer \( w^o_{j,t} \), considering the wage \( w^r_{r,\ell,t} \) requested by workers, if any. Firm \( j \) hires up to the total demand \( L^d_{j,t} \), or up to all workers in the queue, whichever is lower. The total number of workers \( L_{j,t} \) the firm will employ in \( t \), given the current workforce \( L_{j,t-1} \), is bound by:

\[
0 \leq L_{j,t} \leq L^d_{j,t} \leq L^s_{j,t}, \quad L^z_{j,t} = L_{j,t-1} + \#\{\ell^z_{j,t}\}, \quad z = d, s.
\]

The search, wage determination and firing processes differ according to the configuration. When there is no negotiation (North region), firm \( j \) offers the wage:

\[
w^o_{j,t} = w^o_{j,t-1}(1 + W P_{j,t} + N(0, w^o_{err})) \text{ bounded to } \ p_{j,t-1} A_{j,t-1},
\]

12
that is accepted by the worker if she has no better offer. The wage premium is defined as:

\[
WP_{j,t} = \psi_2 \frac{\Delta A_t}{A_{t-1}} + \psi_4 \frac{\Delta A_{j,t}}{A_{j,t-1}}, \quad \psi_1 + \psi_2 \leq 1,
\]

being \( A_t \) the aggregate labour productivity, \( \Delta \) the time difference operator, and \((\psi_1, \psi_2) \in \mathbb{R}_+^2\) parameters. \( w_{o,j,t} \) is also applied to existing workers. \( w_{o,j,t} \) is bounded to the break-even wage (zero unit profits myopic expectation). When one-round of negotiation exists (South region), workers have reservation wages equal to the unemployment benefit, if any, and request a wage \( w_{r,\ell,t} \) in the job application:

\[
w_{r,\ell,t} = \begin{cases} 
  w_{\ell,t} - 1 (1 + \epsilon) & \text{if employed in } t-1 \\
  w_{s,\ell,t} & \text{if unemployed in } t-1 
\end{cases}
\]

\( w_{\ell,t} \) is the current wage for the employed workers and \( \epsilon \in \mathbb{R}_+ \), a parameter. Unemployed workers have a shrinking satisfying wage \( w_{s,\ell,t} \), accounting for the wage history:

\[
w_{s,\ell,t} = \max \left( w_{u,t}, \frac{1}{T_s} \sum_{h=1}^{T_s} w_{\ell,t-h} \right),
\]

being \( T_s \in \mathbb{N}_+ \), the moving average time-span parameter. An employed worker accepts the best offer \( w_{o,j,t} \) she receives if higher than current wage \( w_{\ell,t} \). An unemployed worker accepts the best offer if at least equal to the unemployment benefit \( w_u \).

Government imposes a minimum wage \( w_{i}^{min} \) on firms, indexed on aggregate productivity \( A_t \):

\[
w_{i}^{min} = w_{i-1}^{min} \left( 1 + \psi_1 \frac{\Delta A_t}{A_{t-1}} \right).
\]

Appendix A describes the remaining behavioural rules governing agents interaction within our model, whereas Appendix B presents the baseline parameters’ set-up, the initial conditions and the stock-flow matrix describing the interplay between sectors and agents populating the model.

### 3.2 Two-region set-up

The two macro-regions are differentiated only in terms of the labour market institutional set-up, therefore we isolate the role played by labour market heterogeneity as a source of divergence between the two regions. We want to study how such divergence in the labour market might eventually reverberate into different technological and productive patterns. In Table 1 we present the main differences between the two regions.

Region 1 (i.e. the North) has been modelled to account for lower probabilities for workers of being unemployed (firing restrictions), mostly insensitive wages to the business cycles (low cyclicity of wage adjustments), and wages growth rate fully indexed to labour productivity growth. Moreover, the Northern labour market is also characterized by lower inequalities among workers inside the same firms, and hiring rules favouring those workers endowed with higher skills. Longer tenure rates result into higher skill level of the workforce.

On the contrary, Region 2 (i.e. the South) is characterized by higher workers probability of being unemployed due to less stringent firing restrictions, a certain degree of wage sensitivity to business cycle fluctuations and partial indexation of wage growth.
rates to labour productivity growth. Higher levels of inequalities among workers are also recorded in Region 2, and the hiring and firing rules target cheaper/more expensive workers being firms oriented to cost-reduction strategies. The higher level of unemployment and lower duration of employment relationships result into lower skill level of the workforce, being tenure rates reduced.

Figure 2 presents a synthetic description of the two distinct configurations of the labour markets in terms of unemployment and vacancy rates (panel a), inequality (panel b), and skill levels of the workforce (panel c), average values across 50 Monte Carlo runs for 400 time steps. As shown, the labour market functioning deeply differs in the two regions.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NORTH</th>
<th>SOUTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Differentiated firm-level wages</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage sensitivity to unemployment</td>
<td>low (rigid)</td>
<td>high (flexible)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage indexation to productivity</td>
<td>full</td>
<td>partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour-firing restrictions</td>
<td>under losses only</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker-hiring priority</td>
<td>higher skills</td>
<td>lower wages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker-firing priority</td>
<td>lower skills</td>
<td>higher wages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker new-job search intensity</td>
<td>low ($\omega = 2$)</td>
<td>high ($\omega = 5$)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Differentiating characteristics of modelled macro-regions.

### 3.3 Simulation schedule

In each period, during the simulation model the following events take place:

1. Workers (employed and unemployed) update their skills;
2. Machines ordered in the previous period (if any) are delivered;
3. Capital-good firms perform R&D and signal their machines to consumption-good firms;
4. Consumption-good firms determine their desired production, investment and workforce;
5. Firms allocate cash-flows and (if needed) borrow from banks to operate and invest;
6. Firms send/receive machine-tool orders for the next period (if applicable);
7. Job-seeking workers send job applications to firms;
8. Wages are set (collective indexation or individual negotiation) and job vacancies are partly or totally filled;
9. Firms pay wages/bonuses and government pays unemployment benefits;
10. Consumption-good market opens and market shares are allocated according to the relative competitiveness of firms;
11. Firms and banks compute their profits, pay taxes and repay (part of) their debt;
12. Exit takes place, near-zero share and bankrupt firms leave the market;
13. Prospective entrants decide to enter according to market conditions;
14. Aggregate variables are computed and the cycle restarts.

4The same differentiation has been employed in Dosi et al. (2021) however with reference to the dynamics of specific firms, labelled as unionised and non-unionised. Similar configurations of the labour market regimes have been used to characterise a Fordist and a Competitive setting in Dosi et al. (2017, 2018a,b).
(a) Unemployment and vacancy rates

(b) Inequality level

(c) Worker skills

Figure 2: The North-South region set-up of labour markets - averages for 50 MC runs
4 Sources of divergence

In this Section we present the main results provided by our simulation model. Table 2 summarizes the large collection of stylized facts and statistical regularities, at both micro- and aggregate-level, that the model is able to reproduce (Dosi et al., 2010, 2017, 2018a, 2020). On the lower part of the Table the statistical regularities related to labour market functioning and dynamics are shown. At the micro-level, heterogeneous skills distribution, fat-tailed distributions of individual unemployment time and wage growth rates are recorded; at the macro-level, persistent unemployment rates, the emergence of a wage curve, Beveridge curve and Okun curve, the high volatility of separation and hiring rates, matching function between the finding rate and the vacancy on unemployment ratio, the higher volatility of unemployment and vacancy rates vis-à-vis labour productivity, and the positive correlation between unemployment and inequality are all stylized facts robustly characterizing the model behaviour.

Table 2: Stylized facts matched by the labour-augmented K+S model at different aggregation levels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MICROECONOMIC STYLIZED FACTS</th>
<th>AGGREGATE-LEVEL STYLIZED FACTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Skewed firm size distribution</td>
<td>Endogenous self-sustained growth with persistent fluctuations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fat-tailed firm growth rates distribution</td>
<td>Fat-tailed GDP growth rate distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heterogeneous productivity across firms</td>
<td>Endogenous volatility of GDP, consumption and investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persistent productivity differentials</td>
<td>Cross-correlation of macro variables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumpy investment rates of firms</td>
<td>Pro-cyclical aggregate R&amp;D investment and net entry of firms in the market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heterogeneous skills distribution</td>
<td>Persistent and counter-cyclical unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fat-tailed unemployment time distribution</td>
<td>Endogenous volatility of productivity, unemployment, vacancy, separation and hiring rates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fat-tailed wage growth rates distribution</td>
<td>Unemployment and inequality correlation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pro-cyclical workers skills accumulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beveridge curve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Okun curve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wage curve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Matching function</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dosi et al. (2020).

In the following we present a series of macro-level statistics focusing on innovation and investment variables, with the aim of capturing the extent to which the differences in the labour markets across the two regions impact the model behaviour. Figure 3 presents some key selected simulation results for the two macro-regions, the North (in black) and the South (in blue). The differences in the two labour market set-ups are represented in Figure 3 showing the divergent pattern of average real wages (panel a). Such divergence in the labour market structure however also affects the innovative activities of firms, both in the upstream sector producer of capital goods, and in the downstream sector producer of consumption goods. While the emergent wage gap is expected, being the labour mar-
kets differently configured, the R&D expenditures gap is a purely emergent property, with a technological distance increasing over time. The lower innovative activities in the upstream sector of the Southern region is driven by the lower demand of machines deriving from the downstream sector, whose expansionary investment also strongly diverges (panel c). Recall that investment in new machines is driven by higher demand of final goods. Considering the lower aggregate demand due to lower wages, investments in new capital goods are constrained. Lower demand for investment causes a contraction in the production of new machines from the upstream sector, therefore reducing the effort in innovative activities. This is the first-order degree of asymmetries deriving from different organizations of the labour markets across the two regions. Indeed, negative feedback loops propagate from the labour market to the investment and innovative activities.

Is it only the demand of new investment goods lagging behind in the Southern region or other productive dynamics are affected as well? Figure 4 shows the that gap in expansionary investment also affects substitutionary investment (panel a), that is firms’ ability to renew their capital endowment to produce more efficiently. Such lower degree of both expansionary and substitutionary investments results into a lower aggregate capital over labour (K/L) ratio (panel b), that is a proxy of mechanization. What does it happen to profits? Figure 4.c shows an increasing accumulation of profits in the South not reinvested in productive assets (Π/K). Therefore a rent-seeking mechanism in the region wherein firms mainly rely on cost-reduction, lower job quality, poor innovation-oriented strategies and weaker capital accumulation efforts neatly emerges.

Table 3 provides a synthetic overview on the performance comparison between the North and the South. All key indicators related to aggregate performance, from GDP and labour productivity growth, to innovation and imitation rates, to both expansionary and substitutionary investments are significantly lower in the South, recording the emergence of a falling behind pattern with respect to the North.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3: Performance comparison between two regions, selected time series.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NORTH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Productivity growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expansionary Investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substitutionary Investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital/labour ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit rate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Baseline values are averages for 50 MC runs in period [301, 500]. Ratios between baseline and alternative scenario MC averages. p-values for a two-means *t*-test among scenarios, *H₀*: no difference between scenarios.
Figure 3: From wage divergence to innovation and investment divergence - averages for 50 MC runs
Figure 4: From investment divergences to unproductive profit accumulation - averages for 50 MC runs
5 Policy strategies for the North-South convergence

Once ascertained the role of different institutional labour market set-ups on the North-South divergence, we now move to identify possible policy strategies that may favour the convergence process. To this purpose, we investigate the effects of three parameters potentially influencing the underlying North-South gap and we comparatively assess the role of three convergence policies, which belong both to the domains of institutional policies, acting via non-market mechanisms (the first two), and to the one of market policies, acting via price mechanisms (the last one), namely:

1. **Investment policy** aimed at fostering higher scrapping of machine vintages, governed by the parameter \( b \) in equation 15;

2. **Learning policy** aimed at increasing worker skills and learning activities on the job, governed by the parameter \( \tau_T \) in equation 17;

3. **Wage indexation policy** aimed at increasing the elasticity of wage increases to firm-level productivity increases, governed by the parameter \( \psi_4 \) in equation 24.

We start by presenting the results of the investment policy aimed at stimulating machine scrapping. In order to study such an effect, we perform a local sensitivity analysis, increasing the parameter \( b \) governing the scrapping rule of machines by the consumption-good firms: a higher \( b \) parameter entails a longer payback period to repay the cost of machines, therefore inducing higher substitutionary investments. New generations of machines imply a higher productivity in producing goods, as new machines embed more efficient techniques of production along the productivity ladder. Consistently, Figure 5, presenting three alternative parameter values, shows that fostering scrapping of old machines turns out to be highly effective in stimulating the convergence of the South. According to all the metrics under consideration, averages across 50 Monte Carlo runs, namely the average productivity growth, innovation and imitation rates - the latter being calculated as the share of firms accessing into innovative and imitative behaviour in the upstream sector - are substantially higher for higher value of the parameter. This means that more dynamic investment patterns in the South stimulate the convergence process between the two macro-regions. Table 5 summarises the results of the performance comparison across the alternative parametrizations, reporting in both cases a lower North-South gap in productivity, innovation and imitation rates.

From an evolutionary perspective, the upgrading of firms’ available machineries (i.e. embodied technical change) is pivotal to maintain a highly dynamic technological profile and to increase, in turns, the probability of catching-up between following and leading countries or regions (Dosi et al., 2009). In support of our results, a recent empirical contribution (Fiori and Scoccianti, 2021) highlights the negative role exerted by the poor dynamics of machines renewal among Italian firms on the aggregate productivity performance. Although focusing on the aftermath of the financial crisis (2011-12), the results confirm the positive impact of more dynamic scrapping activities at a firm-level on aggregate productivity.

The second experiment studies the effect of a learning policy mapped by an increase in the parameter \( \tau_T \) governing workers’ skills accumulation while they are employed. Differ-
ently from the monotonic behaviour of the investment policy fostering higher scrapping, Figure 6 shows a non-monotonic effect of this policy experiment. While a 1% increase of the parameter is non effective in fostering the convergence, a 5% level of the parameter is actually self-defeating for the aggregate dynamics. Such unexpected result of a high level of learning rate derives from the higher concentration of very few productive firms coexisting with a large fringe of low productive ones. In addition, extremely high learning rates of the labour force are associated with a higher productivity spread across firms, skyrocketing profit rates, but also higher unemployment and inequality. The end result is the existence of a tiny fraction of an elite of firms dominating the market. Table 5 summarizes the results in terms of alternative settings of the parameter $\tau_T$.

The combination of the two policy experiments rooted on an institutional approach to convergence sheds a light on the relevance of coordinated industrial policies. Indeed, learning policies per se are not sufficient but should be combined with policies triggering an increase in the level of mechanization of the production activity: an investment policy aimed at strengthening the technological profile of less developed areas via more dynamic scrapping processes should be matched by labour market policy interventions favouring the accumulation of workers skills and firms’ production and organizational capabilities, and ultimately their dynamic interaction with more complex technological environments (Lundvall, 1992; Freeman, 2002; Dosi et al., 2009). The latter labour market policies meant to foster workers tenure and experience might be obtained only under stable and secure labour markets, not flexible ones. On this ground, with reference to a case of an effective convergence process, Boltho et al. (2018) highlight how the quite complex and advanced capability endowment of the former East German Länder crucially contributed to the convergence process after the unification in 1989. At the opposite, the lack of a proper set of techno-organizational capabilities in the South of Italy represents one of the actual causes maintaining a divergence between the North and South (Costa et al., 2021; Sbardella et al., 2021). Therefore, rather than in oppositions, labour and machine upgrading are two complementary policies effective in bolstering convergence.

The third experiment presents instead a market-based policy. We intend to study the effect of a higher firm-level wage indexation to idiosyncratic productivity growth. In order to study such an effect, we increase the value of the parameter $\psi_4$ vis-à-vis the parameter governing the wage increase with respect to aggregate productivity of the economy, $\psi_2$. The underlying idea is that the higher indexation of wages to productivity growth, making wages more sensitive to firm-level dynamics will reward more those workers employed in high-productive firms and less workers employed in low-productive firms. The net effect will result in more flexible and sensitive wage adjustments to local changes, therefore making the system more efficient according to a market-based functioning. Figure 7 confronts three values of the adjustment parameter $\psi_2$ ranging from medium to full indexation at the firm-level. The results show that this market-based policy is completely ineffective in fostering the convergence process, without changing any of the three selected metrics (productivity growth, innovation and imitation rates). If anything, higher flexibility in wage adjustments increases the variability of the metrics, as shown by the higher confidence intervals. Table 6 lists the effects of the exercise.
Figure 5: Investment policies bolstering capital productivity
Figure 6: Learning policies bolstering labour productivity
Figure 7: Wage policies increasing firm-level wage indexation (gabbie salariali)
### Table 4: Performance comparison between two regions, selected time series. Investment policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NORTH Baseline</th>
<th>SOUTH ( b = 3.0 )</th>
<th>SOUTH ( b = 9.0 )</th>
<th>SOUTH ( b = 12.0 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDP growth</strong></td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.853</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Productivity growth</strong></td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.851</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Innovation</strong></td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td>0.809</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Imitation</strong></td>
<td>0.309</td>
<td>0.843</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.910</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Baseline values are averages for 50 MC runs in period \([301, 500]\). Ratios between baseline and alternative scenario MC averages. \( p \)-values for a two-means \( t \)-test among scenarios, \( H_0: \) no difference between scenarios.

### Table 5: Performance comparison between two regions, selected time series. Learning policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NORTH Baseline</th>
<th>SOUTH ( \tau_T = 0.01 )</th>
<th>SOUTH ( \tau_T = 0.02 )</th>
<th>SOUTH ( \tau_T = 0.05 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDP growth</strong></td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.853</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Productivity growth</strong></td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.851</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Innovation</strong></td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td>0.809</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Imitation</strong></td>
<td>0.309</td>
<td>0.843</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.847</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Baseline values are averages for 50 MC runs in period \([301, 500]\). Ratios between baseline and alternative scenario MC averages. \( p \)-values for a two-means \( t \)-test among scenarios, \( H_0: \) no difference between scenarios.

### Table 6: Performance comparison between two regions, selected time series. Wage indexation policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NORTH Baseline</th>
<th>SOUTH ( \psi_4 = 0.5 )</th>
<th>SOUTH ( \psi_4 = 0.75 )</th>
<th>SOUTH ( \psi_4 = 1.0 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDP growth</strong></td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.853</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Productivity growth</strong></td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.851</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Innovation</strong></td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td>0.809</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Imitation</strong></td>
<td>0.309</td>
<td>0.843</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.836</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Baseline values are averages for 50 MC runs in period \([301, 500]\). Ratios between baseline and alternative scenario MC averages. \( p \)-values for a two-means \( t \)-test among scenarios, \( H_0: \) no difference between scenarios.
These results are quite enlightening for the policy debate on the Italian North-South gap as they suggest that while investment policies, here represented by the scrapping of old vintages, are highly effective in fostering convergence, a higher weight given to the firm-level wage-productivity indexation is actually ineffective in terms of catching-up. On this ground, we can parallel the effects of the wage indexation policy to the so-called ‘gabbie salariali’ (wage traps), that is a policy scheme that has dramatically exacerbated the North-South divide in Italy during the 1960s and the 1970s, by leading to low-productivity firm-level strategies and low technology-oriented sectoral composition in the Mezzogiorno (Graziani, 1989, 1993; Svimez, 2019). Although the adoption of this scheme has been recently re-proposed in the debate by contributions calling for wage flexibilization and local wage-productivity indexation to enhance the convergence process (Boeri et al., 2021), our results militate against such policy proposal, which turns out to be ineffective in closing the gap, while it increases variability in the outcome variables, therefore making the whole system less stable.

5.1 Shift-and-share decomposition of productivity growth

Finally, in order to investigate how alternative policy strategies affect labour productivity we perform a FHK labour productivity decomposition (Foster et al., 2001) aimed at distinguishing the different contributions to consumption-good firms’ labour productivity growth. In particular, the decomposition allows to capture which type of adjustments taking place within consumption-good firms, whether due to firm-specific learning or reallocation of labour, contributed the most to the pattern of productivity growth. The first term is the within-firm component of productivity growth measured by the firm-level productivity change weighted by firm’s share of labour. The second term is the between-firm component measured by firm labour share weighted by the firm’s relative productivity. The third term captures the covariance of the firms’ productivities and labour allocations. The last two terms measure the proportional contribution of the entry and exit of firms in the market. All terms are normalized with the industry average productivity, as follows:

\[
\Delta \log A_t = \sum_j \Delta \log A_{j,t}^\text{WITHIN} + \sum_j \Delta f_{j,t} \left( \log A_{j,t} - \log A_t \right) + \sum_j \Delta \log A_{j,t} \Delta f_{j,t}^\text{CROSS} + \sum_j \Delta f_{j,t} \left( \log A_{j,t} - \log A_t \right) - \sum_j f_{j,t-h} \left( \log A_{j,t-h} - \log A_t \right) - \sum_j f_{j,t-h} \left( \log A_{j,t-h} - \log A_t \right)
\]

where \( f_{j,t} \) is the employment share, \( A_{j,t} \) is the labour productivity of firm \( j \), and \( \log A_t \) is the sectoral weighted average (log) productivity in period \( t \). The decomposition is computed over a rolling window of fixed length (set at 8 periods), which adds an extra term for the unexplained difference between the total and the sum of the decomposition components.

Figure 8 presents our results. The investment policy (i.e. higher \( b \) parameter), primarily fosters higher productivity growth vis-à-vis the baseline South via firms’ entry and exit processes, both positively contributing. The learning policy (i.e. higher \( \tau_T \) fosters
Figure 8: Behind the effects of alternative policies: labour productivity decomposition

Table 7: Shift-and-share decomposition of log-normalized labour productivity growth across policy scenarios.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>WITHIN</th>
<th>BETWEEN</th>
<th>CROSS</th>
<th>ENTRY</th>
<th>EXIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>North Baseline</td>
<td>40.85</td>
<td>37.03</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-2.28</td>
<td>5.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.77)</td>
<td>(0.71)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Baseline</td>
<td>34.62</td>
<td>38.15</td>
<td>7.85</td>
<td>-11.65</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.60)</td>
<td>(0.62)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South $b = 9.0$</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>37.48</td>
<td>9.34</td>
<td>-11.04</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>1.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.64)</td>
<td>(1.15)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.49)</td>
<td>(0.46)</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South $\tau_T = 0.02$</td>
<td>34.97</td>
<td>40.68</td>
<td>23.01</td>
<td>-31</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.06)</td>
<td>(0.92)</td>
<td>(0.50)</td>
<td>(1.00)</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South $\psi_4 = 0.75$</td>
<td>33.70</td>
<td>27.82</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>-1.85</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>2.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.75)</td>
<td>(1.67)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Moving averages for 25 MC runs over an 8-period window in period [301, 500]. MC standard errors in parentheses.
higher productivity growth via the between firm effect, the reallocation dynamics, but also increases the negative contribution of the cross effect, with negative co-movements between changes in labour productivity and changes in employment shares hinting at labour-shedding processing occurring in high-productivity firms. Therefore, as previously discussed, this kind of policy produces not univocal effects on productivity dynamics. Finally, the wage indexation policy (i.e. higher $\psi$) reduces the positive effects of the within component, while decreases the negative contribution of the cross effect and increases the positive contribution of exit vis-à-vis the South baseline. The net effect of this recombination of contributions is an invariant, slightly lower, total productivity growth (first column of Table 7).

6 Conclusions

To what extent the Italian North-South divide might be mitigated by policies for convergence? Comparing market-based versus non-market based policies, which turn out to be more effective? This paper addresses these questions by means of an agent-based model able to firstly account for patterns of structural divergence, and then employed to test alternative policy mechanisms succeeding or not in obtaining convergence. The model, encompassing two macro-regions characterised by the same productive and innovation structure, but differentiated in their labour market organization, is able to produce persistent divergence in many outcome variables. Therefore, we first provide evidence of the negative feedback loop going from informal and weak labour markets to the productive and innovation dynamics. Once defined the sources of divergence, we test the effects of three different policies, namely an investment policy fostering machine upgrading, a learning policy aimed at increasing workers skills, and a decentralised wage policy increasing the indexation to firm-level productivity changes. According to our results, the investment policy fostering machine upgrading turns out to be the most effective in reducing the productive gap. When decomposing productivity growth according to a shift-and-share analysis, positive entry and exit effects drive the overall labour productivity increase. At the opposite, decentralised wage adjustments to firm-level productivity growth fail in fostering convergence, while the policy increases the instability of the system.

The agent-based approach looks promising in understanding which directions of policy interventions might be taken to promote economic convergence between North vs South areas/countries and might be extended beyond the specific Italian case to the broader domain of convergence paths of developing economies. With respect to the extant agent-based literature, the contribution specifically addresses the study of alternative policy schemes and their net impact in terms of both macroeconomic attributes and the industry dynamics. Limitations of our setting include the absence of the rise and fall of new sectors (Dosi et al., 2021, for a recent ABM advancement), potentially affected by direct policy interventions, the absence of trade across regions and the lack of the role of education. Indeed, education, trade and structural change are at the core of the theory of economic development and ensuing patterns of convergence/divergence (Meier and Stiglitz, 2001) therefore they require to be specifically addressed.

In terms of policy implications, our paper is quite telling about the urgent need of developing industrial policies able to foster convergence also specifically addressing the climate change transition, configuring as such as coherent policy strategies able to tackle
the triple crisis (socio, economic, and ecological). Indeed, selective industrial policies to reconvert so called cathedrals in the desert, or left-behind places (Leyshon, 2021), or places that do not matter (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018), might be a strategy able to target at the same time productive reconversion but also economic, social and ecological upgrading of such areas. The South of Italy is plenty of cases like steel plants, petrochemical or mining sites affected by strong environmental pollution and economic degradation. Targeted industrial policies in the South, in combination with the Next Generation EU plan, should exactly start from those places.

References


Appendix A

Firms’ entry, competitiveness and pricing rule

Prospective firms in both sectors decide on entry based on the number $F_{z,t-1}^z$ ($z = 1, 2$) and financial conditions of incumbents. The number of entrants in sector $z$ is:

$$b_t^z = \max \left( \left[ (o\pi_t^z + (1-o)MA_t^z) F_{t-1}^z, 0 \right], \quad z = 1, 2, \right.$$  \hspace{1cm} (29)

being $o \in [0, 1]$ a mix parameter and $\pi_t^z$ a uniform random draw on the fixed support $[\bar{x}_2^z, \bar{x}_3^z]$ representing the idiosyncratic component in the entry process. The sectoral market attractiveness $MA_t^z$ is evaluated based on the dynamics of firms’ balance sheets:

$$MA_t^z = MC_t^z - MC_{t-1}^z \quad \text{(bounded to $[\bar{x}_2^z, \bar{x}_3^z]$)},$$  \hspace{1cm} (30)

defined as the (log) ratio between the aggregate sectoral stocks of liquid assets $NW_{t-1}^z$ (bank deposits) and debt $Deb_{t-1}^z$ (bank loans):

$$MC_t^z = \log NW_{t-1}^z - \log Deb_{t-1}^z.$$  \hspace{1cm} (31)

In the consumer-good sector, firms compete according to their relative cost competitiveness. Firms’ market share evolves following a replicator dynamics:

$$f_{j,t} = f_{j,t-1} \left( 1 + \chi \frac{E_{j,t} - E_t}{E_t} \right), \quad E_t = \frac{1}{F_t^2} \sum_j E_{j,t} f_{j,t-1},$$  \hspace{1cm} (32)

where $\chi \in \mathbb{R}_+$ is a parameter, $F_t^2$ indicates the current number of firms operating in the consumer-good market, $E_t$ is the average competitiveness, and firm’s relative competitiveness $E_{j,t}$ is defined by the individual normalized price $p_{j,t}$, unfilled demand $l_{j,t}$ and product quality $q_{j,t}$, with parameters $(\omega_1, \omega_2, \omega_3) \in \mathbb{R}_3^+$:

$$E_{j,t} = \omega_1 \left( 1 - p_{j,t-1}^j \right) + \omega_2 \left( 1 - l_{j,t-1}^j \right) + \omega_3 q_{j,t-1}^j.$$  \hspace{1cm} (33)

Firms set consumption-good prices with a variable mark-up $\mu_{j,t}$ over the average unit cost $c_{j,t}$:

$$p_{j,t} = (1 + \mu_{j,t})c_{j,t}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (34)

Firms’ mark-up rule is also driven by the evolution of individual market shares with parameter $\nu \in \mathbb{R}_+$:

$$\mu_{j,t} = \mu_{j,t-1} \left( 1 + \nu \frac{f_{j,t-1} - f_{j,t-2}}{f_{j,t-2}} \right),$$  \hspace{1cm} (35)

Unfilled demand $l_{j,t}$ is the difference between actual demand ($D_{j,t}$) that firm $j$ gets and its effective production ($Q_{j,t}$) plus existing inventories ($N_{j,t}$) accumulated from the previous periods, if any:

$$l_{j,t} = \max \left[ D_{j,t} - (Q_{j,t} + N_{j,t}), 0 \right].$$  \hspace{1cm} (36)

The quality of consumer-good produced by firm $j$ is determined by the average (log) skill level of its workers. This allows us to reproduce the mechanism under which firm-specific accumulated skills are more complementary to incremental product innovation.

$$q_{j,t} = \frac{1}{L_{j,t-1}} \sum_{\ell \in \{L_{j,t-1}\}} \log \left[ s_{\ell,t-1} \right],$$  \hspace{1cm} (37)
Banks, government, and consumption

There are $B$ commercial banks (subscript $k$) which take deposits and provide credit to firms. Bank-firm pairs are set randomly and are stable along firms’ lifetime. Bank profits come from interest received on loans ($\text{Loans}_{k,t}$) and on reserves at the central bank ($\text{Res}_{k,t}$) deducted from interest paid on deposits ($\text{Depo}_{k,t}$) and from losses from defaulted loans ($\text{BadDeb}_{k,t}$):

$$\Pi^b_{k,t} = r^{\text{deb}} \text{Loans}_{k,t} + r^{\text{res}} \text{Res}_{k,t} - r^{\text{D}} \text{Depo}_{k,t} - \text{BadDeb}_{k,t}, \quad (38)$$

being $(r^{\text{deb}}, r, r^{\text{D}}) \in \mathbb{R}^3_+$ the interest rates on debt, bank reserves, and deposits, respectively.

Government taxes firms and banks profits at a fixed rate $\tau r \in \mathbb{R}_+$:

$$\text{Tax}_t = (\Pi^1_t + \Pi^2_t + \Pi^b_t) \tau r, \quad (39)$$

where $\Pi^1_t$, $\Pi^2_t$ and $\Pi^b_t$ are the aggregate total profits of the capital-good, the consumer-good and the banking sectors, respectively. It pays to unemployed workers a benefit $w^u_t$ which is a fraction of the current average wage $\bar{w}_t$:

$$w^u_t = \psi \bar{w}_t - 1, \quad (40)$$

where $\psi \in [0, 1]$ is a parameter. The recurring total public expenditure $G_t$ and the public primary deficit (or surplus) are:

$$G_t = (L^S - L^D_t) w^u_t. \quad (41)$$

$$\text{Def}_t = G_t - \text{Tax}_t, \quad (42)$$

The stock of public debt is updated as in:

$$\text{Debt}_t = \text{Debt}_{t-1} + \text{Def}_t - \Pi^b_t + G^\text{bail}_t, \quad (43)$$

where $\Pi^b_t$ is the operational result (profits/losses) of the central bank and $G^\text{bail}_t$ is the cost of rescuing (bail-out) the banking sector during financial crises, if any.

Workers fully consume their income (if possible) and do not get credit. Accordingly, desired aggregate consumption $C^d_t$ depends on the income of both employed and unemployed workers plus the desired unsatisfied consumption from previous periods:

$$C^d_t = \sum_\ell w^d_{\ell,t} + G_t + (C^d_{t-1} - C_{t-1}). \quad (44)$$

The effective consumption $C_t$ is bound by the real production $Q^2_t$ of the consumption-good sector:

$$C_t = \min(C^d_t, Q^2_t), \quad Q^2_t = \sum_j Q^j_{t,t}. \quad (45)$$

The model applies the standard national account identities by the aggregation of agents’ stocks and flows. The aggregate value added by capital- and consumption-good firms $Y_t$ equals their aggregated production $Q^1_t$ and $Q^2_t$, respectively (there are no intermediate goods). That is equal to the sum of the effective consumption $C_t$, the total investment $I_t$ and the change in firm’s inventories $\Delta N_t$:

$$Q^1_t + Q^2_t = Y_t = C_t + I_t + \Delta N_t. \quad (46)$$

For further details, see Dosi et al. (2010), Dosi et al. (2015) and Dosi et al. (2017).
Appendix B
Baseline calibration and model Stock-Flow consistency

Table B.1: Model parameters and initial conditions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SYMBOL</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>VALUE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy and credit market</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi$</td>
<td>Unemployment subsidy rate on average wage</td>
<td>0.200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$tr$</td>
<td>Tax rate</td>
<td>0.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r$</td>
<td>Prime interest rate</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r_D$</td>
<td>Interest rate on bank deposits</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu_{deb}$</td>
<td>Mark-up of interest on debt over prime rate</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu_{res}$</td>
<td>Mark-up of interest on reserve to prime rate</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Lambda$</td>
<td>Prudential limit on debt (sales multiple)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Lambda_{min}$</td>
<td>Prudential limit on debt (fixed floor)</td>
<td>20000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Labour market</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>$w_{err}$</td>
<td>SD of error when evaluating the market wage</td>
<td>0.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\epsilon$</td>
<td>Minimum desired wage increase rate</td>
<td>0.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau_T$</td>
<td>Skills accumulation rate on tenure</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau_U$</td>
<td>Skills deterioration rate on unemployment</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$T_r$</td>
<td>Number of periods before retirement (work life)</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$T_s$</td>
<td>Number of wage memory periods</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\omega$</td>
<td>Number of firms to send applications (employed)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\omega_{un}$</td>
<td>Number of firms to send applications (unempl.)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\psi_2$</td>
<td>Aggregate productivity pass-through</td>
<td>1.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\psi_4$</td>
<td>Firm-level productivity pass-through</td>
<td>0.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\psi_b$</td>
<td>Share of firm free cash flow paid as bonus</td>
<td>0.200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Technology</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\eta$</td>
<td>Maximum machine-tools useful life</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\nu$</td>
<td>R&amp;D investment propensity over sales</td>
<td>0.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\xi$</td>
<td>Share of R&amp;D expenditure in imitation</td>
<td>0.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$b$</td>
<td>Payback period for machine replacement</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$dim_{mach}$</td>
<td>Machine-tool unit production capacity</td>
<td>40</td>
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<tr>
<td>$(\alpha_1, \beta_1)$</td>
<td>Beta distribution parameters (innovation process)</td>
<td>(3,3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(\alpha_2, \beta_2)$</td>
<td>Beta distribution parameters (entrant productivity)</td>
<td>(2,4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(\zeta_1, \zeta_2)$</td>
<td>Search capabilities for innovation/imitation</td>
<td>(0.300,0.300)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[\bar{x}_1, \bar{x}_1]$</td>
<td>Beta distribution support (innovation process )</td>
<td>[-0.150,0.150]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continue...)

Baseline parameter settings
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SYMBOL</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>VALUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Industrial dynamics</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma$</td>
<td>Share of new customers for capital-good firm</td>
<td>0.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$i$</td>
<td>Desired inventories share</td>
<td>0.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu_1$</td>
<td>Mark-up in capital-good sector</td>
<td>0.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$o$</td>
<td>Weight of market conditions for entry decision</td>
<td>0.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi$</td>
<td>Replicator dynamics coefficient (compet. intensity)</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$v$</td>
<td>Mark-up adjustment coefficient</td>
<td>0.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$u$</td>
<td>Planned utilization by consumption-good entrant</td>
<td>0.750</td>
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<tr>
<td>$x_5$</td>
<td>Max technical advantage of capital-good entrant</td>
<td>0.300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$exit_1$</td>
<td>Min orders to stay in capital-good sector</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$exit_2$</td>
<td>Min share to stay in consumption-good sector</td>
<td>$10^{-5}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[\Phi_1, \Phi_2]$</td>
<td>Min/max capital ratio for consumer-good entrant</td>
<td>[0.100, 0.900]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[\Phi_3, \Phi_4]$</td>
<td>Min/max net wealth ratio for capital-good entrant</td>
<td>[0.100, 0.900]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\omega_1$</td>
<td>Competitiveness weight for price</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\omega_2$</td>
<td>Competitiveness weight for unfilled demand</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\omega_3$</td>
<td>Competitiveness weight for quality</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[\bar{x}_1^2, \bar{x}_2^2]$</td>
<td>Entry distribution support for capital-good firm</td>
<td>[-0.150, 0.150]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[\bar{x}_3^1, \bar{x}_4^1]$</td>
<td>Entry distribution support for consumer-good firm</td>
<td>[-0.150, 0.150]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[F_{min}^1, F_{max}^1]$</td>
<td>Min/max number of capital-good firms</td>
<td>[1, 100]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[F_{min}^2, F_{max}^2]$</td>
<td>Min/max number of consumer-good firms</td>
<td>[1, 400]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Initial conditions</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu_0$</td>
<td>Initial mark-up in consumption-good sector</td>
<td>0.200</td>
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<tr>
<td>$K_0$</td>
<td>Initial capital stock in consumer-good sector</td>
<td>800</td>
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<tr>
<td>$L_0^0$</td>
<td>Number of workers</td>
<td>2,510^5</td>
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<tr>
<td>$S_0$</td>
<td>Initial consumer unfilled-demand savings</td>
<td>1,110^6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$B_0$</td>
<td>Number of banks</td>
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<tr>
<td>$(F_0^1, F_0^2)$</td>
<td>Initial number of capital/consumption-good firms</td>
<td>(20, 200)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$NW_0^b$</td>
<td>Initial net wealth of banking sector</td>
<td>1.010^6</td>
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<tr>
<td>$(NW_0^C, NW_0^C)$</td>
<td>Initial net wealth capital/consumption-good sector</td>
<td>(10000, 5000)</td>
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</table>

Baseline parameter settings
Table B.2: Stock-and-flow consistency: transaction flow matrix.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>∑</th>
<th>Workers</th>
<th>Capital-good firms</th>
<th>Consumption-good firms</th>
<th>Bank</th>
<th>Government</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-C</td>
<td>+I</td>
<td>-W^2</td>
<td>-Π^2</td>
<td>-G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-I</td>
<td>+Π^2</td>
<td>+Tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-rDeb^1_t</td>
<td>+rDeb^2_t</td>
<td>-ΔDeb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+ΔDeb^1</td>
<td>-ΔDeb^2</td>
<td>+ΔDeb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-rNW^1_t</td>
<td>+rNW^2_t</td>
<td>-ΔNW</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+ΔNW^1</td>
<td>-ΔNW^2</td>
<td>+ΔNW</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tax</td>
<td>-Tax</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>∆Deb</td>
<td>-∆Deb</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>∆NW</td>
<td>-∆NW</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>∆Change in debt</td>
<td>-∆Change in deposits</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Government deficit/superavit is close to zero in the long run.