2012/12 | LEM Working Paper Series | |
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Decidability in complex social choices |
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Luigi Marengo, Davide Pirino, Simona Settepanella, Akimichi Takemura |
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Keywords | ||
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Social rule, object, optimum, probability, tournament
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JEL Classifications | ||
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D03, D71, D72
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Abstract | ||
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Recently, Marengo and Settepanella (2010) introduced a model of social
choice among bundles of interdependent elements. In this paper we
prove that their voting model is highly decidable, i.e. a group of
agents that agrees to use such voting process has an high probability
to reach a final decision. We also better qualify the degree of
manipulability of such a final decision, showing that it is
independent not only from the agenda, but also from the initial
condition. Therefore we show that the Marengo and Settepanella (2010)
model has nice properties of decidability and can be fruitfully used
both for normative and positive analyses of collective choices among
complex interdependent elements.
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Downloads | ||
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