2012/12 LEM Working Paper Series

Decidability in complex social choices

Luigi Marengo, Davide Pirino, Simona Settepanella, Akimichi Takemura
Social rule, object, optimum, probability, tournament

  JEL Classifications
D03, D71, D72

Recently, Marengo and Settepanella (2010) introduced a model of social choice among bundles of interdependent elements. In this paper we prove that their voting model is highly decidable, i.e. a group of agents that agrees to use such voting process has an high probability to reach a final decision. We also better qualify the degree of manipulability of such a final decision, showing that it is independent not only from the agenda, but also from the initial condition. Therefore we show that the Marengo and Settepanella (2010) model has nice properties of decidability and can be fruitfully used both for normative and positive analyses of collective choices among complex interdependent elements.
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