2012/11 | LEM Working Paper Series | |
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Decidability and manipulability in social choice |
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Gennaro Amendola, Luigi Marengo, Simona Settepanella |
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Keywords | ||
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Social choice, agenda, object construction, hyperplane arrangement, directed graphs, algorithm
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JEL Classifications | ||
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D03, D71, D72
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Abstract | ||
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We present a geometric model of social choice among bundles of
interdependent elements, that we will call objects. We show that the
outcome of the social choice process is highly dependent on the way
these bundles are formed. By bundling and unbundling the same set of
constituent elements an authority enjoys a vast power of determining
the social outcome, as locally or globally stable social optima can be
created or eliminated. At the same time, by bundling and unbundling
elements, it is also possible to greatly increase or decrease
decidability both because the likelihood of intransitive cycles varies
and because the time required to reach a social optimum varies. In
this paper we present a rigorous framework which allows us to study
this trade-off between decidability and non-manipulability.
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