2008/24 | LEM Working Paper Series | |
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A computational voting model |
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Luigi Marengo, Corrado Pasquali |
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Keywords | ||
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Social choice; object construction power; agenda power; intran-
sitive cycles; median voter theorem.
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JEL Classifications | ||
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D71, D72
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Abstract | ||
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Social choice models usually assume that choice is among exogenously
given and non decomposable alternatives. Often, on the contrary,
choice is among objects that are constructed by individuals or
institutions as complex bundles made of many interdependent
components. In this paper we present a model of object construction in
majority voting and show that, in general, by appropriate changes of
such bundles, different social outcomes may be obtained, depending
upon initial conditions and agenda, intransitive cycles and median
voter dominance may be made appear or disappear, and that, finally,
decidability may be ensured by increasing manipulability or viceversa.
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